ActorFulcrumSec
Entry vectorIterable admin API
keys in frontend
JavaScript on root
domain of all 3
airport sites
Published550GB uncompressed
after ransom refusal
People affected8.8 million
(HaveIBeenPwned
parsed and added)
Data exposedNames, emails
phones, postcodes
vehicle registrations
bookings, SMS
What happened
Issue 121 covered the initial Manchester Airports Group disclosure on August 30, which confirmed that FulcrumSec found Iterable API credentials in client-side JavaScript and used them to exfiltrate 86GB of internal data. The situation has materially changed on four dimensions this week. First, FulcrumSec confirmed additional technical details: the credentials were not API-level read tokens but full Iterable administrator keys, which provide complete access to the Iterable marketing platform including all contact records, campaign history, user segments, event logs, and the ability to send messages as the organization. Second, FulcrumSec clarified that the keys were on the root domains of all three airport websites: Manchester Airport, London Stansted, and East Midlands, not on subdomains or administrative panels. Third, Manchester Airports Group received a ransom demand and refused to pay. Fourth, following the refusal, FulcrumSec published approximately 550 gigabytes of uncompressed data on its leak site. The 86GB figure in the initial disclosure represented the compressed exfiltrated data; extracted it totals approximately 640GB across all exported files. HaveIBeenPwned parsed the dataset and confirmed approximately 8.8 million email addresses and phone numbers, adding the dataset to its database so affected individuals can check their own exposure. The published data includes names, email addresses, phone numbers, residential postcodes, vehicle registration plates, browser agent strings, purchase histories covering car park, lounge, and fast-track bookings, SMS message contents, and other personal information. MAG confirmed bank details and payment card information were not stored in the affected systems. FulcrumSec stated in communications with BleepingComputer that it had used the same JavaScript API key exposure method to access Arup Group and Novo Nordisk earlier in 2026, describing those keys as found on less prominent subdomains rather than root domains.
Why it matters
The FulcrumSec disclosure following ransom refusal is a live case study in the core dilemma of data-theft extortion: paying does not guarantee data deletion, but refusing guarantees publication if the attacker follows through. Manchester Airports Group's refusal resulted in 8.8 million records being published and verified by HaveIBeenPwned. The Iterable administrator key detail is separately significant. Administrator access to a marketing platform gives complete access to every customer contact record, campaign, and communication log managed by the platform. It also typically gives the ability to send emails and SMS messages as the organization to any contact in the database. An attacker with Iterable administrator access at an airport operator has not only the customer PII but the ability to send fraudulent booking confirmations, phishing messages, or credential harvesting campaigns to 8.8 million people who would have no reason to distrust a message appearing to come from an airport they have used.
Don't miss
FulcrumSec's note in its leak post that it used the same JavaScript API key exposure method to breach Arup Group and Novo Nordisk earlier in 2026 confirms that the Manchester Airports Group incident is not a one-off. FulcrumSec has a documented and repeatable pattern: scan the frontend JavaScript of target organizations' public websites for API keys to marketing platforms, customer data platforms, and other SaaS services, use those keys to exfiltrate customer data, and extort the organization under threat of publication. Issue 121's recommendations for scanning production JavaScript remain the most directly applicable preventive control. Arup Group and Novo Nordisk represent the prior disclosed incidents in this pattern. Any organization that uses a marketing automation platform, CRM, or customer data platform through an API integration in its web application should verify that the API credentials for those integrations are not embedded in frontend JavaScript. This check should extend to all active web properties including subdomains.
Potential actions
- If your organization has not yet conducted a frontend JavaScript scan for embedded API credentials, do so now. FulcrumSec's confirmed pattern of targeting Iterable, and its reference to prior breaches at Arup Group and Novo Nordisk through the same vector, indicates this is a systematic scanning campaign rather than an opportunistic finding. Use tools such as Trufflehog or Gitleaks against deployed JavaScript bundles on all web properties including subdomains. Rotate any credentials found immediately.
- Affected individuals can check whether their data is in the Manchester Airports Group dataset through HaveIBeenPwned. The dataset has been added to the database and is searchable by email address. Given the presence of vehicle registration plates and residential postcodes in the dataset, affected individuals should be aware that the exposed information is more comprehensive than a typical email address breach and could be used in targeted social engineering or identity verification fraud.
The Sip
Admin keys for the marketing platform. In the JavaScript source of the airport homepage. Three airports, same method, same group. MAG refused the ransom. FulcrumSec published 550GB covering 8.8 million people, now searchable on HaveIBeenPwned. The same pattern worked on Arup Group and Novo Nordisk earlier this year. Scan the frontend JavaScript on every web property you operate. Administrator keys to SaaS platforms should never be in client-side code.